

Market Pricing Working Group

-- DRAFT TRACKING DOCUMENT OF PRICING ISSUES AND INITIATIVES --

Issue ID	INITIATIVE	DATE RAISED & DESCRIPTION	STATUS	NEXT STEPS	PRIORITY	RELATED ISSUES/ INITIATIVES	ADDITIONAL REFERENCES
004	Use of 12-times Ramp Rate in the Dispatch Unconstrained Algorithm	<p>12-times ramp rate introduced in April 2002 to address periods of large demand change.</p> <p>When determining the real-time uniform market clearing price, it is assumed that dispatchable facilities have an energy ramping capability that is 12 times higher than their actual ramping capability (i.e. 60 minutes of ramping capability in a 5-minute period).</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">[open]</p> <p>In consultation with stakeholders through the 2006 calendar year the IESO has put forward a proposal to modify the existing 12X RR assumption used in the market schedule to a 3X RR assumption. With this change, if approved by the OEB, the prices of the unconstrained pricing methodology would be closer to the results of constrained dispatch. This change is being implemented through rule amendment MR-00331-R00.</p>	<p>Awaiting the Ontario Energy Board ruling on MR-00331-R00- Specify the Facility Capability in the Market Schedule. The OEB ruling is expected by April 10, 2007.</p>	H	002; 004; 005; 012; 016; 022; 025; 027; 031	<p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/mr2006/MR-00331-R00.pdf</p> <p>http://www.theimo.com/imoweb/pubs/consult/mktOps/mo_pres_PricingIssuesUpdate_2003Dec03.ppt</p> <p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG-20060303-12x-Options.pdf</p> <p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG-20060303-Pricing-Options.pdf</p>
025	Temporal Optimization in the Real-Time Constrained Sequence but Not in the Real-Time Unconstrained Sequence	<p>Noted in January 2003 IMO MEP discussion paper. The IESO's Dispatch Scheduling Optimizer derive dispatch instructions for dispatchable facilities every five minutes. Prior to mid-2004, the results for each five-minute interval were calculated independently – the requirements of future intervals were not considered. Consequences included: Fast-loading resources tend to be cycled more frequently than is desirable; Loading fast-loading resources based on the economics of one interval can drive the system into reserve shortfalls when more expensive, slow-loading resources are all that is available in subsequent intervals; CMSC payments arise. Multi-Interval Optimization (MIO) was deployed in the constrained sequence on June 23, 2004. Myopic determination of market prices in the unconstrained sequence remains.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">[open]</p> <p>It was decided during the 12X RR discussions that the opportunity cost of designing and implementing an unconstrained MIO would be too high and that there are other more substantive market evolution initiatives to pursue. Simulations did not demonstrate significant changes in price patterns relative to status quo; hence, there was unlikely to be substantial increased efficiency from moving to an unconstrained MIO pricing methodology</p>	<p>Awaiting the Ontario Energy Board ruling on MR-00331-R00- Specify the Facility Capability in the Market Schedule. The OEB ruling is expected by April 10, 2007.</p>	H	003; 004; 005; 009; 012; 027; 31;	<p>http://www.theimo.com/imoweb/pubs/consult/mep/mep_MIOProposal_20030131.pdf</p> <p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG-20060303-12x-Options.pdf</p> <p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG-20060303-Pricing-Options.pdf</p>

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031	Multi-Interval Optimization Pricing Methodology	<p>Noted in January 2003 IESO MEP discussion paper.</p> <p>When adopting a MIO approach in the unconstrained sequence there are a number of price determining methodologies that may result in different prices under similar scenarios. The variations discussed with the MPWG are "High Slice" price and "Incremental".</p>	<p>[open]</p> <p>Multi-Interval Optimization (MIO) was deployed in the constrained sequence on June 23, 2004. It was decided during the 12X RR discussions that the opportunity cost of designing and implementing an unconstrained MIO would be too high and that there are other more substantive market evolution initiatives to pursue. Simulations did not demonstrate significant changes in price patterns relative to status quo; hence, there was unlikely to be substantial increased efficiency from moving to an unconstrained MIO pricing methodology</p>	<p>Awaiting the Ontario Energy Board ruling on MR-00331-R00- Specify the Facility Capability in the Market Schedule. The OEB ruling is expected by April 10, 2007.</p>	H	003; 004; 005; 009; 012; 025; 027;	<p>http://www.theimo.com/imoweb/news/newsItem.asp?newsItemID=1127</p> <p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG_2004Jan14_MIO-PriceTest.pdf</p> <p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG_2005Feb2_MIOPriceSimLim.pdf</p> <p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG_2005Feb25_MIO_TestResults.pdf</p> <p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG-20060303-12x-Options.pdf</p>
007	Imports and Exports Setting Price	<p>Noted early in the operation if the IESO-administered markets and raised again by Day-Ahead Market working group in early 2004.</p> <p>Issue relates to the different treatment of import offers and export bids in pre-dispatch as compared to real-time and related implications (i.e. Imports and exports cannot set price in real time).</p>	<p>[open]</p> <p>At the August 4th meeting of the MPWG the IESO put forth their opinion that Intertie transactions setting the real time price should not be pursued at this time. The IESO believes that only resources that are dispatchable in real time can set the real time price and that this initiative should be deferred and addressed in the context of a Day Ahead Market design.</p> <p>At the October 6th meeting of the MPWG members agreed to defer work on this initiative until the DAM design work is completed.</p>	<p>If Ontario does not implement a DAM, the IESO has committed to re-visit this issue.</p>	H	006; 008; 012; 013; 014; 024;	<p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG-20060303-Issue7-Imports-Exports-Setting-Price.pdf</p> <p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG-20060303-Intertie-Set-Price.pdf</p> <p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG-20060804-intertie.pdf</p>

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032	Role of Import Offer Guarantee	Noted in Market Surveillance Panel Report, June 14, 2004. Issue relates to the question of whether the Import Offer Guarantee is appropriate in certain hours such as 23:00 and 24:00. Namely, whether the premiums paid in such hours are worth the benefits.	[open] "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group for August 20, 2004.		M		http://www.theimo.com/imoweb/pubs/marketSurv/ms_mspReport-20040614.pdf
001	Pre-Dispatch Price Uncertainty	Noted in May 2003 Pricing Team Report. Many participants (importers/exporters, participants in TDRP and HADL) use pre-dispatch prices in both making business decisions and managing their actions in the market. However, the IESO currently publishes no information on pre-dispatch price uncertainty.	[open] "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group for August 20, 2004 (new name and major re-write).		M	009; 012; 013; 014; 015	http://www.theimo.com/imoweb/pubs/consult/mktOps/mo_paper_PricingIssues_20030528.pdf
009	Use of Peak Demand Load Forecast in Pre-Dispatch	Noted by Market Surveillance Panel Results in an overestimation of pre-dispatch prices relative to the real-time HOEP. The use of a peak load forecast in pre-dispatch schedules additional resources in pre-dispatch that have a dampening effect on real time price.	[open] At the December 6, 2006 meeting of the MPWG the IESO presented the gross inefficiencies analysis. This analysis found that a peak demand forecast was not causing gross inefficiencies. This analysis utilized the results of the pricing simulation that was presented to the working group at its September 1 st meeting. The simulation results demonstrated the potential real time price impacts of moving to an average demand forecast in pre-dispatch.	Conduct analysis to determine a metric to measure the generic inefficiencies of a peak demand forecast and consult with IESO-Operations to determine the reliability impacts of moving to an average demand forecast in some hours.	M	001; 010; 013; 014; 015;	http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG-20060901-Guide_to_Peak_vs_Avg_Data.pdf http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG-20060901-Peak_Avg_.pdf http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG-20061206-Peak-vs-Avg-Gross-Inefficiencies-presentation.pdf

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026	Integration of Competitive and Regulated Wholesale Prices	Raised in April 2004. The Ontario Ministry of Energy's "new vision" for Ontario electricity sector would entail a combination of a regulated and a competitive electricity generation sector whereby part of the supply would be price-regulated by the Ontario Energy Board, and part would be paid the competitive market price.	[open] Not addressed in MPWG work packages. Preliminary "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group for August 20, 2004.		H		http://www.energy.gov.on.ca/index.cfm?fuseaction=english.news&back=yes&news_id=59&background_id=44
016	Historical Analysis of Nodal Prices	Entails: (a) total pricing comparison - to consistently compare uniform and nodal prices and show how these prices have varied over time; (b) Spatial analysis - to show how nodal prices have varied across Ontario	[open] As a component of the IESO's locational price study the analysis of the shadow prices was performed in the expectation of using these prices as a proxy for the potential price impacts of a locational pricing regime. We discovered during this review that the posted nodal prices may not be a good predictor of market pricing results under a locational pricing regime. Please see the presentation given to the MPWG on October 6, 2006 for further details.	Unknown at this time	M	002; 004; 010; 017; 018; 019; 020; 022; 023; 027;	http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG-20061006-LMP-presentation.pdf http://www.theimo.com/imoweb/pubs/consult/mep/DAM_WG_2003Dec11-NodalAnalysis.pdf
005	Simultaneous Use of Ramping Generation Units for Energy and Operating Reserve	Noted by Day-Ahead Market working group. Current algorithm will not simultaneously schedule a generating unit at its maximum ramp capability for energy and reserve. The simultaneous use of ramping and reserve would be allowed under the proposed Day-Ahead Market design.	[open] "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group for August 20, 2004.		L	003; 004; 013; 022; 025;	http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG_2004Aug20_IS_S05_SimUseRamping.pdf
011	Comparing Treatment of Self-Scheduling Resources in Pre-Dispatch and Real-Time	Noted by Market Surveillance Panel Issue relates to implications of differences in assumptions concerning Self Scheduling Generator (SSG) output due to inconsistencies between the schedules provided by the SSG units (used in pre-dispatch) and the forecasted output (used in the real time constrained sequence).	[open] "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group for August 20, 2004.		L		http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG_2004Aug20_IS_S11_SSG_Treatment.pdf

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018	Pricing and Allocating Line Losses	Noted during historical analysis of nodal prices. Under the current uniform pricing system, losses are allocated on an Ontario-wide average basis and are recovered as uplift. Under a nodal system, line loss costs are allocated to each node in a manner that recognizes each node's individual contribution to/impact on those costs.	[open] "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group in July 2004.		L	002; 016; 019; 022; 027;	http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/consult/emp/MP_WG_2004jul09_ISS18-PricAllocLineLoss.pdf
019	Penalty Factors (Formerly referred to in this document as Line Loss Factors. The name has been changed to agree with the rules and the upcoming stakeholder engagement plan)	Noted during historical analysis of nodal prices. Relates to whether static rather than dynamic penalty factors are used.	[open] "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group in July, 2004.	Market Entry and Analysis is in the process of creating a Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SE-40) to work with stakeholders on possible changes to loss factors for Ontario resources. SE-40 is expected to be posted shortly.	L	018; 022;	http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/consult/emp/MP_WG_2004jul09_ISS19-NodeLossFact.pdf
020	Treatment of Imports in a Congestion Pricing Regime	Noted during historical analysis of nodal prices.	[open]		L	002; 007; 016; 017; 022; 027;	
022	Pricing Physical Constraints	Prices are currently computed in an unconstrained market sequence, whereas dispatch instructions are issued according to a security constrained sequence. Additional costs are incurred in Ontario's "uniform pricing" system when the actual security constrained dispatch of resources required to satisfy load at a given interval differs from the purely economic solution produced by the unconstrained algorithm. These additional side-payments pose implications for efficient market signalling.	[open] "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group in July, 2004.		L	002; 004; 016; 018; 023; 027;	

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023	Uncertainty with respect to Constraint Payments	Prompted by October 2002 review of the Market Surveillance Panel and raised in August 2004 by the IESO Market Pricing Working Group. Issue relates to general concerns expressed by market participants over the future prospect and impact of changes to Ontario's constraint payment regime.	[open] Following consultation on the issue, the Market Surveillance Panel concluded in 2003 that "elimination of all constrained off CMSC payments at this point in the evolution of the market would be premature". The Panel asserted that it "will revisit the issue of CMSC payments towards the end of 2004, in light of conditions at that time". Proposed Ontario Day-Ahead Market would feature uniform pricing with CMSC. "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group for August 20, 2004 (new name and major rewrite).		L	004; 014; 016; 022;	http://www.theimo.com/imoweb/pubs/consult/cmssc/cmssc_paper_20030218.pdf
027	Timing Differences Between Unconstrained And Constrained Real-Time Sequences	In December 2003, the IESO's Day Ahead Market Working Group developed an analysis comparing "uniform" and nodal prices for a given study period and addressing the causes of the differences between those prices. It was found that differences between uniform and nodal prices were partly attributable to demand differences between the real-time unconstrained and constrained sequences.	[open] "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group in June 2004.	As suggested at the June 25 Market Pricing Working Group meeting, further analysis could entail analyzing, among other things, the magnitude, frequency, timing, and distribution of over- and under-forecasts of demand.	L	002; 004; 010; 012; 013; 016; 018; 020; 022;	
030	Forecast of Real-Time Price	Noted in Appendix C of the Market Surveillance Panel report for September 2002 – January 2003. This issue relates to providing market participants with price information - in pre-dispatch - that is a more accurate forecast or indication of what the HOEP is likely to be. Such forecasts might assist participants in the price discovery process. Currently, the IESO does not forecast the real-time price.	[open] Market Surveillance Panel Report # 2 (March 24, 2003) outlined a possible approach whereby forecasts of market prices could be formally produced based on factors such as primary demand forecast, expected supply capability, and expected intertie transactions. A probability distribution could then be assigned around each factor and, using a Monte Carlo technique, a distribution of resulting market prices could be developed. "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group for August 20, 2004.	The IESO is investigating real-time price forecasting methodologies	L	001; 006; 009; 010; 012; 013; 014; 015; 024;	http://www.theimo.com/imoweb/pubs/marketSurv/msmspReport_20030331.pdf

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033	Rules for Determining Prices in Times of Shortage	Noted in Market Surveillance Panel Report, June 14, 2004. Issue relates to the shortage-pricing algorithm provided for in Chapter 7, s. 8.2.2.2. of the IESO Market Rules.	[open] "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group, August 2004.		L		http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/consult/emp/MP_WG_2004aug06_Issue33.pdf
034	Rules Concerning the Breaker Status of "Quick Start Facilities"	Noted in Market Surveillance Panel Report, June 14, 2004. Issue relates to consideration of the appropriateness of existing rules concerning the breaker status of quick start facilities.	[open] "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group, August 2004.		L		http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/consult/emp/MP_WG_2004aug06_Issue34.pdf
002	Publishing Nodal Price Data	Noted in December 2003 as part of Day-Ahead Market working group historical nodal pricing analysis.	[CLOSED] Representative nodal prices for 10 Ontario zones and generator weighted average prices are now available on "Market Summaries" section of IESO Web "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group for August 20, 2004.	N/A		004; 016; 018; 020; 022; 023; 27;	http://www.theimo.com/imoweb/marketdata/marketSummary.asp
003	Information to Explain Dispatch Optimization Process	Noted in May 2004 at 1 st Market Pricing working group stakeholder meeting.	[CLOSED] IESO has issued a "Quick Take" QT20 – Joint Optimization of Energy and Operating Reserve.			004; 005; 013; 017; 024;	

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006	Effects of Emergency Purchases on the Market	Noted in May 2004 at 1 st Market Pricing working group meeting.	[CLOSED] On June 16, 2005 the Board approved MR-00296 allowing the IESO to not reduce the amount of non-dispatchable load when Emergency Energy purchases have been performed. Previously, IESO procedures stated that when emergency energy was purchased the equivalent amount of non-dispatchable load would be removed from the price setting mechanism, thereby causing the price to fall. This lead to a counter intuitive pricing signal as emergency energy is typically purchased during periods of tight supply-demand balance when it would be expected that prices rise, not fall. The market rule amendment allows the IESO to modify the procedure to no longer remove the demand from the price setting mechanism and avoiding the potential counter intuitive price signal.	N/A		001; 003; 005; 007; 009; 013; 014; 015; 024; 027;	http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/mr/MR_00296-R00_BA.pdf

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008	Systematic Differences Between Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets	Noted by Day-Ahead Market working group. Bids and offers in the proposed Day-Ahead Market design could be submitted in multiple parts, consisting of "start-up", minimum generation", & "incremental energy" components. Current real-time market does not provide for such multi-part bids and offers.	[CLOSED] At October 20 MPWG meeting, it was noted that, in general, design differences between the DA and RT markets will not affect price convergence between the markets as long as participants at the margin are able to adjust their bids freely in both markets. It was also noted that all but two of the identified differences between the IESO's markets are also present in other areas such as NYISO. "2-pager" issue document under development by Market Pricing Working Group, October 2004.	"2-Pager" issue document to be updated in view of MPWG discussion of October 20. Some concern regarding the ability of participants to bid freely in either market remains. However this is a broader participation issue that cannot be addressed by the MPWG. Any effect on this issue due to Bill 100 legislation or related regulations will be monitored under issue 26 (Integration of Competitive and Regulated Wholesale Prices).		007; 005; 012;	
010	Over-Forecasting of Demand in Hours 23, 24.	Noted in Market Surveillance Panel report #2	[CLOSED] "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group in July, 2004.	IESO adjusted formula that selects the peak demand for these 2 hours. Outstanding issues will be covered under Issue #9.		001; 009; 013; 014; 015;	http://www.theimo.com/imoweb/pubs/marketSurv/ms_mspReport_20030331.pdf

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012	Under-commitment of Available Generation	Noted in May 2003 Pricing Team Report as Spare Generation On-Line. Insufficient amounts of available generation was being committed by participant, to address disturbances or changes in system conditions close to real-time, thereby requiring IESO to rely on out of market resources. Arises from risk of not recovering start-up and min generation costs.	[CLOSED] Implemented Generation Cost Guarantee provisions in market in August 2003. Arrangement entails guaranteed "start-up", "speed no-load", and "minimum generation" costs to eligible resources. "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group for September 03, 2004.	N/A		001; 008; 009; 010; 013; 014; 015; 027;	http://www.theimo.com/imoweb/pubs/consult/mktOps/mo_paper_PricingIssues_20030528.pdf
013	Impact of Out of Market Sources of Operating Reserve on the Market	Noted in May 2003 Pricing Team Report:	[CLOSED] A total of 800 MW of CAOR is currently in the real time market, with only 400 MW being available in pre-dispatch. The 800 MW represents the demand reduction available from 3 and 5 % voltage reductions (400 MW) and disregarding the 30 minute OR requirement. CAOR discussion paper sent to MPWG in January 2006	N/A	H	001; 003; 005; 006; 009; 010; 012; 014; 015; 024; 027; 35; 36	http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG-20060120-CAOR-discussion-paper.pdf
014	Hour(s)-Ahead Price Signal Uncertainty	Noted in May 2003 Pricing Team Report. Hour-Ahead Dispatchable load initiative raised as a way to increase the amount of price-responsive load within the IESO-administered markets, particularly in view of the limited extent to which certain loads are able to respond to five-minute dispatch instructions due to physical limitations.	[CLOSED] Hour-Ahead Dispatchable Load Offer Guarantee that would compensate load for reducing its consumption on the basis of pre-dispatch when real-time price was such that the load would not have reduced its consumption. Allows to submit offers to reduce consumption and indicate the amount of consumption reduction that would occur at a specific price if dispatched. Implemented in May 2003. Current participation consists of ~235MW.	N/A		001; 003; 004; 006; 007; 009; 010; 012; 013; 015; 023; 024;	
015	Restriction on Changes to Dispatch Data between 4 and 2 hours ahead of Dispatch Hour	Noted in May 2003 Pricing Team Report. Relates to increasing the ability of Market Participants to react to market or system changes occurring prior to the dispatch hour.	[CLOSED] Unrestricted changes to dispatch data up to 2 hours ahead of dispatch hour allowed. Introduced on trial basis in 2002, implemented in September 2003. "2-pager" issue document developed by Market Pricing Working Group for August 20, 2004.	N/A		001; 006; 007; 009; 010; 012; 013; 014; 024;	

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017	Settlement Adjustment and Allocation	Noted in Market Pricing Working Group Meeting, August 20 2004.	[CLOSED] The IESO Board has approved MR-00291-R00 which changes the treatment of Settlement adjustments that occur after the final settlement statement has been issued. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> For adjustments less than \$3.5 Million The existing process of using current period adjustments will be used for any adjustments For Adjustments greater than or equal to \$3.5 million An adjustment period allocation will be used attempting to allocate the adjustment to the appropriate market participants during the period which instigated the adjustment. 	N/A			http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/mr/MR_00291-R00-R03_BA.pdf http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG_2004Nov26_ISSUE%2017.pdf http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG_2005Mar10_Iss17Redline.pdf
021			Incorporated into issue #27. September, 2004.				
024	Reducing Frequency of Failed Intertie Transactions	Noted in May 2003 Pricing Team Report. Three avenues to reduce failed intertie transactions: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> continued enforcement of compliance with Market Rules discussing measures to better align inter-jurisdictional trading with neighbouring systems investigating potential improvements to the bidding/offering process for exports and import 	[CLOSED] This issue is being addressed by other forums (Real-Time Intertie Transaction Failures integration with Day-Ahead Commitment Process).	N/A		001; 006; 012; 013; 014; 015;	http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/consult/consult_isr.asp http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/consult/consult_se14.asp

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028	Compensation under Administered Pricing when Incorrect Prices have been Posted	Noted in January 2004, Identified as Participant Issue #924. Load customers that respond to high prices that are determined to be incorrect lose significant production and income and become hesitant to respond to price signals. To increase their confidence in the price signals they would like to be compensated for losses in the event that prices are corrected.	[CLOSED] If a load is dispatched to consumer in real time and the prices are administered after the fact the resulting price may be higher than their bid price. Loads encountering such circumstances will be entitled to claim compensation equal to the difference between their bid price and the administered price. The amendment only applies during administrative pricing events that extend beyond 48 intervals or that result from a suspension of the market. During these times CMSC payments no longer apply. This is the equivalent treatment for generators that encounter similar situations.	N/A			http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/mr/MR_00292-R00_BA.pdf http://www.theimo.com/imoweb/implementation/issues_log.asp http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG_2005Feb2_Iss28DiscussOptPaper.pdf http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/consult/mep/MP_WG_2005Mar10_Iss28Redline.pdf
029			Incorporated into issue #1. September, 2004.				
035	Impact of "Other" Out Of Market Control Actions on the Market	Noted in May 2003 Pricing Team Report:. Issue relates to market impacts of control actions other than emergency imports or use of out of market operating reserve.	[CLOSED] On June 16, 2005 the Board approved MR-00296 which allows the IESO to increase or decrease demand in the market schedule when the IESO undertakes an emergency control action which affects market demand.. This will hopefully negate the occurrence of counter intuitive pricing events when out of market control actions (such as voltage reductions) are utilized.	N/A		001; 003; 005; 006; 009; 010; 012; 013; 014; 015; 024; 027; 036	http://www.theimo.com/imoweb/pubs/systemOps/so_GridOpPolicies.pdf http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/mr/MR_00296-R00_BA.pdf

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Market Pricing Working Group

-- DRAFT TRACKING DOCUMENT OF PRICING ISSUES AND INITIATIVES --

Issue ID	INITIATIVE	DATE RAISED & DESCRIPTION	STATUS	NEXT STEPS	PRIORITY	RELATED ISSUES/ INITIATIVES	ADDITIONAL REFERENCES
036	Pricing In-Market Control Action Operating Reserve	<p>Noted at July 09 Market Pricing Working Group session.</p> <p>Issue relates to addressing the rationale, market implications, and overall appropriateness of the current prices for in-market CAOR.</p>	<p>[CLOSED]</p> <p>Board has approved MR-00235-R05 which allows the inclusion of an additional 400 MW of CAOR into the market at defined prices. See 'Market Data' link in Additional References for the current implementation details of this rule</p> <p>See Issue 013 (out of market operating reserve) for more information on this issue.</p>	N/A		001; 003; 005; 006; 009; 010; 012; 013; 014; 015; 024; 027; 35	<p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/mr/mr_00235-R00-R05_BA.pdf</p> <p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/pubs/mr/mr_00235-R00-R05_BA.pdf</p> <p>http://www.ieso.ca/imo/web/marketdata/ControlActionOR.asp</p>